In 2019, China and Russia will start using floating nuclear reactors for oil and gas rigs and military bases

In 2019, China should complete floating mobile nuclear reactors to power drilling platforms in the ocean to expedite exploitation of oil, natural gas and combustible ice. A Pentagon report believes China will use floating nuclear reactors to power islands and reefs in the South China Sea.

The cost of diesel generation in the sea is 2 yuan per kilowatt hour, while the cost of nuclear generation could be as low as 0.9 yuan. Also, there will not be the need a vulnerable diesel fuel supply chain to islands.

China could build 20 floating nuclear stations for bases and oil and gas operations across the South China Sea.

Russia launched its floating nuclear reactor in April, 2018. Russia willl use it in the Far East and the Arctic coast off Chukotka. It is expected to go into service in 2019. It will power a port town, oil rigs and a desalination plant. The twin reactors are expected to provide up to 200,000 people with electricity.

CNNC partnered in 2015 with Lloyd’s Register for regulatory support in developing a sea-based, 100-megawatt version of its ACP100 reactor.

China National Nuclear Power (CNNP) is partnering with Chinese shipyards and electric machinery companies to develop a $150 million project.

The ACPR100 and ACPR50S, both with passive cooling for decay heat and 60-year design life. Both have standard type fuel assemblies and fuel enriched to less than 5% with burnable poison giving 30-month refueling. The ACPR100 is an integral PWR, 450 MWt, 140 MWe, having 69 fuel assemblies. Reactor pressure vessel is 17m high and 4.4 m inside diameter, operating at 310°C. It is designed as a module in larger plant and would be installed underground. The applications for these are similar to those for the ACP100.

The offshore ACPR50S is 200 MWt, 60 MWe with 37 fuel assemblies and four external steam generators. Reactor pressure vessel is 7.4 meter high and 2.5 meter inside diameter, operating at 310°C. It is designed for mounting on a barge as floating nuclear power plant (FNPP). Following approval as part of the 13th Five-Year Plan for innovative energy technologies, CGN announced construction start on the first FNPP at Bohai shipyard in November 2016 for trial operation in 2019, supplying power and desalination.

18 thoughts on “In 2019, China and Russia will start using floating nuclear reactors for oil and gas rigs and military bases”

  1. Acpr100 – what babcok&willcox could not get out of conceptual design after spending $500M. 69 fuel assemblies 30 months. My 2012 PHYSOR paper regarding this very scenario has gotten a lot of hits on researchgate. I made it public when mPower went toe-up.

  2. For a military base? On the water? That doesn’t sound … secure. Imagine the possibilities for mischief.

  3. Acpr100 – what babcok&willcox could not get out of conceptual design after spending $500M. 69 fuel assemblies 30 months. My 2012 PHYSOR paper regarding this very scenario has gotten a lot of hits on researchgate. I made it public when mPower went toe-up.

  4. For a military base? On the water? That doesn’t sound … secure. Imagine the possibilities for mischief.

  5. I could imagine that maybe having such a power source on the military base might be more secure than having to supply thousands of tonnes of diesel fuel through a war zone. Or it might not. It depends of dozens of factors, half of which I know nothing about, and some factors may not even be known to the nuclear militaries themselves until they actually have such a war. (History shows that actual wars usually bring up flaws and vulnerabilities that military designers weren’t aware of during decades of tech development during peace time.)

  6. What is not secure about a chinese or russian military base? It’s not like a “green zone” – it’s a hard commie military base.

  7. I could imagine that maybe having such a power source on the military base might be more secure than having to supply thousands of tonnes of diesel fuel through a war zone.Or it might not. It depends of dozens of factors half of which I know nothing about and some factors may not even be known to the nuclear militaries themselves until they actually have such a war. (History shows that actual wars usually bring up flaws and vulnerabilities that military designers weren’t aware of during decades of tech development during peace time.)

  8. What is not secure about a chinese or russian military base? It’s not like a green zone”” – it’s a hard commie military base.”””

  9. True. A simple artillery shell could take out one of these plants and then they’d have to pile sand on it and move. Not good for a FOB, but definitely good for a peace time base.

  10. True. A simple artillery shell could take out one of these plants and then they’d have to pile sand on it and move. Not good for a FOB but definitely good for a peace time base.

  11. I am concerned about nuclear materials after or during a military engagement. Do you think there will be time to safely store these reactors in case of hostilities? They would seem to be an easy target. Kill the enemies power and dose them with radiation while you are at it.

  12. I am concerned about nuclear materials after or during a military engagement. Do you think there will be time to safely store these reactors in case of hostilities? They would seem to be an easy target. Kill the enemies power and dose them with radiation while you are at it.

  13. I am concerned about nuclear materials after or during a military engagement. Do you think there will be time to safely store these reactors in case of hostilities? They would seem to be an easy target. Kill the enemies power and dose them with radiation while you are at it.

  14. True. A simple artillery shell could take out one of these plants and then they’d have to pile sand on it and move. Not good for a FOB, but definitely good for a peace time base.

  15. I could imagine that maybe having such a power source on the military base might be more secure than having to supply thousands of tonnes of diesel fuel through a war zone.
    Or it might not. It depends of dozens of factors, half of which I know nothing about, and some factors may not even be known to the nuclear militaries themselves until they actually have such a war. (History shows that actual wars usually bring up flaws and vulnerabilities that military designers weren’t aware of during decades of tech development during peace time.)

  16. Acpr100 – what babcok&willcox could not get out of conceptual design after spending $500M. 69 fuel assemblies 30 months. My 2012 PHYSOR paper regarding this very scenario has gotten a lot of hits on researchgate. I made it public when mPower went toe-up.

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